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Abstract
A new software-based liveness detection approach using a novel fingerprint parameterization based on quality related
features is proposed. The system is tested on a highly challenging database comprising over 10,500 real and fake
images acquired with five sensors of different technologies and covering a wide range of direct attack scenarios in terms
of materials and procedures followed to generate the gummy fingers. The proposed solution proves to be robust to
the multi-scenario dataset, and presents an overall rate of 90% correctly classified samples. Furthermore, the liveness
detection method presented has the added advantage over previously studied techniques of needing just one image from
a finger to decide whether it is real or fake. This last characteristic provides the method with very valuable features as
it makes it less intrusive, more user friendly, faster and reduces its implementation costs.
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1. Introduction
Automatic access of persons to services is becoming in-
creasingly important in the information era. This has re-
sulted in the establishment of a new technological area
known as biometric recognition, or simply biometrics [1].
The basic aim of biometrics is to discriminate automat-
ically between subjects in a reliable way and according
to some target application based on one or more signals
derived from physical or behavioral traits, such as finger-
print, face, iris, voice, hand, or written signature.
Biometric technology presents several advantages over
classical security methods based on something that you
know (PIN, Password, etc.) or something that you have
(key, card, etc.). Traditional authentication systems can-
not discriminate between impostors who have illegally ac-
quired the privileges to access a system and the genuine
user, and cannot satisfy negative claims of identity (i.e., I
am not John Doe) [1]. Furthermore, in biometric systems
there is no need for the user to remember difficult PIN
codes that could be easily forgotten or to carry a key that
could be lost or stolen.
However, in spite of these advantages, biometric systems
present a number of drawbacks [2], including the lack of
secrecy (e.g., everybody knows our face or could get our
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fingerprints), and the fact that a biometric trait cannot be
replaced (if we forget a password we can easily generate
a new one, but no new fingerprint can be generated if an
impostor steals it). Furthermore, biometric systems are
vulnerable to external attacks which could decrease their
level of security [3, 4, 5], thus, it is of special relevance to
understand the threats to which they are subjected and to
analyze their vulnerabilities in order to prevent possible
attacks and propose new countermeasures that increase
their benefits for the final user.
In the last recent years important research efforts have
been conducted to study the vulnerabilities of biometric
systems to direct attacks to the sensor (carried out using
synthetic biometric traits such as gummy fingers or high
quality iris printed images) [3, 6], and indirect attacks (car-
ried out against some of the inner modules of the system)
[7, 8]. Furthermore, the interest for the analysis of secu-
rity vulnerabilities has surpassed the scientific field and
different standardization initiatives at international level
have emerged in order to deal with the problem of secu-
rity evaluation in biometric systems, such as the Common
Criteria through different Supporting Documents [9], or
the Biometric Evaluation Methodology [10].
Within the studied vulnerabilities, special attention has
been paid to direct attacks carried out against fingerprint
recognition systems [11, 12, 13]. These attacking methods
consist on presenting a synthetically generated fingerprint
to the sensor so that it is recognized as the legitimate user
and access is granted. These attacks have the advantage
over other more sophisticated attacking algorithms, such
as the hill-climbing strategies [7], of not needing any in-
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formation about the internal working of the system (e.g.,
features used, template format). Furthermore, as they
are carried out outside the digital domain these attacks
are more difficult to be detected as the digital protection
mechanisms (e.g., digital signature, watermarking) are not
valid to prevent them.
Two requirements have to be fulfilled by a direct attack
to be successful, 1) that the attacker retrieves by some
unnoticed means the legitimate user’s biometric trait, and
is able to generate an artefact from it (e.g., gummy fin-
ger, iris image), and 2) that the biometric system acquires
and recognizes the captured sample produced with the
fake trait as that of the real user. The first of the con-
ditions is out of the reach of biometric systems designers
as there will always be someone that can think of a way of
illegally recovering a certain trait. Thus, researches have
focused in the design of specific countermeasures that per-
mit biometric systems to detect fake samples and reject
them, improving this way the robustness of the systems
against direct attacks. Among the studied anti-spoofing
approaches, special attention has been paid to those known
as liveness detection techniques, which use different phys-
iological properties to distinguish between real and fake
traits. These methods for liveness assessment represent
a challenging engineering problem as they have to satisfy
certain requirements [14]: i) non-invasive, the technique
should in no case penetrate the body or present and exces-
sive contact with the user; ii) user friendly, people should
not be reluctant to use it; iii) fast, results have to be pro-
duced in very few seconds as the user cannot be asked to
interact with the sensor for a long period of time; iv) low
cost, a wide use cannot be expected if the cost is very high;
v) performance, it should not degrade the recognition per-
formance of the biometric system.
In the present work, we explore the potential of quality
assessment (already considered in the literature for multi-
modal fusion [15], or score rejection [16]), for liveness de-
tection. Thus, a new parameterization based on quality re-
lated measures for a software-based solution in fingerprint
vitality detection is proposed, and its efficiency to counter-
measure direct attacks is evaluated. This novel strategy
has the clear advantage over previously proposed meth-
ods of needing just one fingerprint image (i.e., the same
fingerprint image used for access) to extract the necessary
features in order to determine if the finger presented to the
sensor is real or fake. This fact shortens the acquisition
process and reduces the inconvenience for the final user,
complying this way with the requirements of a liveness de-
tection approach given above: non-invasive, user friendly,
fast, and low cost (being a software-based solution it does
not need of any additional hardware to be embedded in
the acquisition device which would raise the price).
The performance of the proposed method is evaluated
on the database provided in the Fingerprint Liveness De-
tection Competition LivDet 2009 [17], and on a publicly
available database captured at the ATVS group [13]. The
complete experimental dataset comprises over 10,500 real
and fake images captured with five different sensors. It
contains fake samples produced with the most popular ma-
terials used in gummy finger generation (silicone, gelatin,
and playdoh), and following both a cooperative and non-
cooperative process. The experimental results obtained by
the proposed liveness detection approach on these chal-
lenging dataset show that it can be a very powerful tool to
detect gummy fingers (almost 90% of correctly classified
images), and of great utility to be included in real appli-
cations in order to prevent the different types of direct
attacks which have been considered in the literature.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 a summary
of the most relevant related works to the preset study is
given. The overall liveness detection method is presented
in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 the databases used in the experimen-
tal protocol are described. Results are given in Sect. 5.
Conclusions are finally drawn in Sect. 6.
2. Related Works
Different liveness detection algorithms have been pro-
posed for traits such as fingerprint [18], face [19], or iris
[20]. These algorithms can broadly be divided into:
• Software-based techniques. In this case fake traits
are detected once the sample has been acquired with a
standard sensor (i.e., features used to distinguish be-
tween real and fake fingers are extracted from the fin-
gerprint image, and not from the finger itself). These
approaches include the use of skin perspiration [21],
or iris texture [22]. Software-based approaches can
make use of static features being those which require
one or more impressions (e.g., the finger is placed and
lifted from the sensor one or more times), or dynamic
features which are those extracted from multiple im-
age frames (e.g., the finger is placed on the sensor
for a sort time and a video sequence is captured and
analyzed).
The liveness detection method proposed and evalu-
ated in the present work belongs to this class of tech-
niques.
• Hardware-based techniques. In this case some
specific device is added to the sensor in order to de-
tect particular properties of a living trait such as the
blood pressure [23], the odor [24], or the pupil hippus
[25].
Software-based techniques have the advantage over the
hardware-based ones of being less expensive (as no extra
device in needed), and less intrusive for the user (very
important characteristic for a practical liveness detection
solution) [26, 27].
For the particular case of liveness detection methods
for fingerprint verification systems, different solutions have
been proposed in the literature. Regarding software-based
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Figure 1: General diagram of the liveness detection system presented in this work.
approaches, two main groups can be distinguished depend-
ing on the skin features measured: those methods based on
features related to the skin perspiration, and those using
skin elasticity properties. In the case of hardware-based
solutions, different possibilities have been explored, includ-
ing the skin odor, the heart beat, or the blood pressure.
One of the first efforts in fingerprint liveness detection
was carried out by [28] who initiated a research line using
the skin perspiration pattern. In this work they considered
the periodicity of sweat and the sweat diffusion pattern as
a way to detect fake fingerprints using a ridge signal algo-
rithm. In a subsequent work [29], they applied a wavelet-
based algorithm improving the performance reached in
their initial study, and, yet in a further step [21], they
extended both works with a new intensity-based perspira-
tion liveness detection technique which leads to detection
rates of around 90% on a proprietary database. Recently, a
novel region-based liveness detection approach also based
on perspiration features and another technique analyzing
the valley noise have been proposed by the same group
[30, 31].
Different fingerprint distortion models have been de-
scribed in the literature [32, 33, 34], which have led to the
development of liveness detection techniques based on the
flexibility properties of the skin [18, 35, 36]. In particular,
the liveness detection approach proposed by [35] is based
on the differentiation of three fingerprint regions, namely:
i) an inner region in direct contact with the sensor where
the pressure does not allow any elastic deformation, ii)
an external region where the pressure is very light and the
skin follows the finger movements, and iii) an intermediate
region where skin stretching and compressions take place
in order to smoothly combine the previous two. In the
acquisition process the user is asked to deliberately rotate
his finger when removing it from the sensor surface pro-
ducing this way a specific type of skin distortion which is
later used as a fingerprint liveness measure. The method,
which proved to be quite successful (90% detection rates of
the artificial fingers are reported), was later implemented
in a prototype sensor by the company Biometrika [37].
The same research group developed, in parallel to the
skin elasticity method, a liveness detection procedure
based on the corporal odor. [24] use a chemical sensor
to discriminate the skin odor from that of other materi-
als such as latex, silicone or gelatin. Although the system
showed a remarkable performance detecting fake finger-
prints made of silicone, it still showed some weakness rec-
ognizing imitations made of other materials such as gela-
tine, as the sensor response was very similar to that caused
by human skin.
Other liveness detection approaches for fake fingerprint
detection include the analysis of perspiration and elasticity
related features in fingerprint image sequences [38], the use
of electric properties of the skin [39], using wavelets for the
analysis of the finger tip surface texture [40], the use of the
power spectrum of the fingerprint image [41], or analyzing
the ring patterns of the Fourier spectrum [42].
Recently, the organizers of the First Fingerprint Live-
ness Detection Competition (LivDet) [17], have published
a comparative analysis of different software-based solu-
tions for fingerprint liveness detection [27]. The authors
study the efficiency of several approaches and give an esti-
mation of the best performing static and dynamic features
for liveness detection.
Outside the research field some companies have also pro-
posed different methods for fingerprint liveness detection
such as the ones based on ultrasounds [43, 44], on electrical
measurements (some work has been done but apparently
costs are too high), or light measurements ( [45] proposed
a method based on temperature changes measured on an
infrared image).
3. Liveness Detection System
The problem of liveness detection can be seen as a two-
class classification problem where an input fingerprint im-
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Figure 3: Computation of the Orientation Certainty Level (OCL)
for two fingerprints of different quality. Panel (a) are the input fin-
gerprint images. Panel (b) are the block-wise values of the OCL;
blocks with brighter color indicate higher quality in the region.
age has to be assigned to one of two classes: real or fake.
The key point of the process is to find a set of discriminant
features which permits to build an appropriate classifier
which gives the probability of the image vitality given the
extracted set of features. In the present work we propose
a novel parameterization using quality measures which is
tested on a complete liveness detection system.
A general diagram of the liveness detection system pre-
sented in this work is shown in Fig. 1. Two inputs are
given to the system: i) the fingerprint image to be classi-
fied, and ii) the sensor used in the acquisition process.
In the first step the fingerprint is segmented from the
background, for this purpose, Gabor filters are used as
proposed in [46]. Once the useful information of the total
image has been separated, ten different quality measures
are extracted which will serve as the feature vector that
will be used in the classification. Prior to the classification
step, the best performing features are selected depending
on the sensor that was used in the acquisition. Once the
final feature vector has been generated the fingerprint is
classified as real (generated by a living finger), or fake
(coming from a gummy finger), using as training data of
the classifier the dataset corresponding to the acquisition
sensor.
3.1. Feature Extraction
The parameterization proposed in the present work and
applied to liveness detection comprises ten quality-based
features. A number of approaches for fingerprint image
quality computation have been described in the literature.
A taxonomy is given in [16] (see Fig. 2). Image quality
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Figure 4: Computation of the energy concentration in the power
spectrum for two fingerprints of different quality. Panel (a) are the
power spectra of the images shown in Figure 3. Panel (b) shows the
energy distributions in the region of interest. The quality values for
the low and high quality image are 0.35 and 0.88 respectively.
can be assessed by measuring one of the following prop-
erties: ridge strength or directionality, ridge continuity,
ridge clarity, integrity of the ridge-valley structure, or es-
timated verification performance when using the image at
hand. A number of sources of information are used to mea-
sure these properties: i) angle information provided by the
direction field, ii) Gabor filters, which represent another
implementation of the direction angle [47], iii) pixel in-
tensity of the gray-scale image, iv) power spectrum, and
v) Neural Networks. Fingerprint quality can be assessed
either analyzing the image in a holistic manner, or com-
bining the quality from local non-overlapped blocks of the
image.
In the following, we give some details about the quality
measures used in this paper. We have implemented several
measures that make use of the above mentioned properties
for quality assessment, see Table 1:
3.1.1. Ridge-strength measures
• Orientation Certainty Level (QOCL) [48], which
measures the energy concentration along the domi-
nant direction of ridges using the intensity gradient.
It is computed as the ratio between the two eigenval-
ues of the covariance matrix of the gradient vector.
A relative weight is given to each region of the image
based on its distance from the centroid, since regions
near the centroid are supposed to provide more re-
liable information [49]. An example of Orientation
Certainty Level computation is shown in Fig. 3 for
two fingerprints of different quality.
• Energy concentration in the power spectrum
(QE) [49], which is computed using ring-shaped
bands. For this purpose, a set of bandpass filters
is employed to extract the energy in each frequency
band. High quality images will have the energy con-
centrated in few bands while poor ones will have a
more diffused distribution. The energy concentration
is measured using the entropy. An example of quality
estimation using the global quality index QENERGY
is shown in Fig. 4 for two fingerprints of different qual-
ity.
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Figure 5: Computation of the Local Orientation Quality (LOQ) for
two fingerprints of different quality. Panel (a) are the direction fields
of the images shown in Figure 3a. Panel (b) are the block-wise
values of the average absolute difference of local orientation with
the surrounding blocks; blocks with brighter color indicate higher
difference value and thus, lower quality.
3.1.2. Ridge-continuity measures
• Local Orientation Quality (QLOQ) [50], which is
computed as the average absolute difference of direc-
tion angle with the surrounding image blocks, provid-
ing information about how smoothly direction angle
changes from block to block. Quality of the whole
image is finally computed by averaging all the Local
Orientation Quality scores of the image. In high qual-
ity images, it is expected that ridge direction changes
smoothly across the whole image. An example of
Local Orientation Quality computation is shown in
Fig. 5 for two fingerprints of different quality.
• Continuity of the orientation field (QCOF ) [48].
This method relies on the fact that, in good qual-
ity images, ridges and valleys must flow sharply and
smoothly in a locally constant direction. The direc-
tion change along rows and columns of the image is
examined. Abrupt direction changes between consec-
utive blocks are then accumulated and mapped into
a quality score. As we can observe in Fig. 5, ridge
direction changes smoothly across the whole image in
case of high quality.
3.1.3. Ridge-clarity measures
• Mean (QMEAN) and standard deviation (QSTD)
values of the gray level image, computed from the
segmented foreground only. These two features had
already been considered for liveness detection in [27].
• Local Clarity Score (QLCS1 and QLCS2) [50]. The
sinusoidal-shaped wave that models ridges and valleys
[51] is used to segment ridge and valley regions (see
Figure 6). The clarity is then defined as the overlap-
ping area of the gray level distributions of segmented
ridges and valleys. For ridges/valleys with high clar-
ity, both distributions should have a very small over-
lapping area. An example of quality estimation using
the Local Clarity Score is shown in Fig. 7 for two fin-
gerprint blocks of different quality. It should be noted
Figure 6: Modeling of ridges and valleys as a sinusoid.
Low Q block High Q block 
Figure 7: Computation of the Local Clarity Score for two fingerprint
blocks of different quality. The fingerprint blocks appear on top,
while below we show the gray level distributions of the segmented
ridges and valleys. The degree of overlapping for the low and high
quality block is 0.22 and 0.10, respectively.
that sometimes the sinusoidal-shaped wave cannot be
extracted reliably, specially in bad quality regions of
the image. The quality measure QLCS1 discards these
regions, therefore being an optimistic measure of qual-
ity. This is compensated with QLCS2, which does not
discard these regions, but they are assigned the lowest
quality level.
• Amplitude and variance of the sinusoid that
models ridges and valleys (QA and QV AR) [51].
Based on these parameters, blocks are classified as
good and bad. The quality of the fingerprint is
then computed as the percentage of foreground blocks
marked as good.
3.2. Feature Selection
Due to the curse of dimensionality, it is possible that the
best classifying results are not obtained using the set of ten
proposed features, but a subset of them. As we are dealing
with a ten dimensional problem there are 210 − 1 = 1, 023
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Quality measure Property measured Source
QOCL Ridge strength Local angle
QE Ridge strength Power spectrum
QLOQ Ridge continuity Local angle
QCOF Ridge continuity Local angle
QMEAN Ridge clarity Pixel intensity
QSTD Ridge clarity Pixel intensity
QLCS1 Ridge clarity Pixel intensity
QLCS2 Ridge clarity Pixel intensity
QA Ridge clarity Pixel intensity
QV AR Ridge clarity Pixel intensity
Table 1: Summary of the quality measures used in the parameteri-
zation applied to fingerprint liveness detection.
possible feature subsets, which is a reasonably low number
to apply exhaustive search as feature selection technique in
order to find the best performing feature subset. This way
we guarantee that we find the optimal set of features out
of all the possible ones. The feature selection depends on
the acquisition device (as shown in Fig. 1), as the optimal
feature subsets might be different for different sensors.
3.3. Classifier
We have used Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) as
classifier [52]. In the experiments two separate sets have
been used: i) one for development in order to select the
best performing features and to fit the two normal distri-
butions representing each of the classes (real or fake), and
ii) the second for test in order to evaluate the performance
of the algorithm.
4. Datasets and Experimental Protocol
The performance of the proposed liveness detec-
tion scheme is validated on two different databases:
i) the publicly available dataset provided in the
Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition, LivDet
2009 [17] (http://prag.diee.unica.it/LivDet09/) compris-
ing over 18,000 real and fake samples, and ii) a dataset
captured at the Biometric Recognition Group - ATVS
[13], available at http://atvs.ii.uam.es/, which contains
over 3,000 real and fake fingerprint images. Each of the
databases is divided into a development set where the best
feature subsets selected and the system is trained, and a
test set in which the evaluation results are obtained. In
order to generate totally unbiased results, there is no over-
lap between development and test sets (i.e., samples cor-
responding to each user are just included in one of the
sets).
• LivDet Database [17]. It comprises three datasets
of real and fake fingerprints captured each of them
with a different flat optical sensor: i) Biometrika
FX2000 (569 dpi), ii) CrossMatch Verifier 300CL (500
dpi), and iii) Identix DFR2100 (686dpi). The gummy
fingers were generated using three different materi-
als: silicone, gelatine and playdoh, and always with
a following a consensual procedure (with the cooper-
ation of the user). The development and test sets of
this database are the same as the ones used in the
LivDet competition, and their general distribution of
the fingerprint images between both sets is given in
Table 2. Some typical examples of the images that
can be found in this database are shown in Fig. 8,
where the material used for the generation of the fake
fingers is given (silicone, gelatine or playdoh).
• ATVS Database [13]. It comprises three datasets of
real and fake fingerprints captured each of them with
an acquisition device of different technologies: i) flat
optical Biometrika FX2000 (569 dpi), ii) flat capaci-
tive Precise SC100 (500 dpi), and iii) thermal sweep-
ing Yubee with Atmel’s Fingerchip (500dpi). All the
gummy fingers were generated using modeling sili-
cone, but two different procedures were followed: with
and without the cooperation of the user. Both the
development and the test set contain half of the fin-
gerprint images, and their general structure is given
in Table 3. Some typical examples of the images that
can be found in this database are shown in Fig. 9,
where the type of process used for the generation
of the gummy fingers is given (cooperative or non-
cooperative).
From the summary of the two databases given in Ta-
bles 2 and 3 we can see that the complete final validation
dataset comprises over 10,500 real and fake samples, di-
vided into six different datasets (three corresponding to
the LivDet DB and the other three to the ATVS DB),
and captured under totally different scenarios in terms of:
i) acquisition devices, ii) material used to generate the
gummy fingers, and iii) process followed to obtain the fake
images.
As was presented in Sect. 3 (and is shown in Fig 1)
the proposed liveness detection system only presents two
inputs: i) the fingerprint image to be classified, and ii)
the sensor used to acquire that image. This way, although
the material with which the different fake fingers are made
is known, this fact is not used in anyway by the liveness
detection system as in a real attack this information would
not be available to the application. The feature selection
is just made in terms of the sensor used in the acquisition.
It can be noticed from the examples shown in Figs. 8 and
9 the difficulty of the classification problem, as even for a
human expert would not be easy to distinguish between
the real and fake samples present at the final dataset.
5. Results
The performance of the proposed approach is estimated
in terms of the Average Classification Error (ACE) which
is defined as ACE = (FLR + FFR)/2, where the FLR
(False Living Rate) represents the percentage of fake fin-
gerprints misclassified as real, and the FFR (False Fake
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LIVDET PUBLIC DATABASE
BIOMETRIKA  FX2000 
(FLAT OPTICAL SENSOR)
REAL  
FAKE 
 (WITH USER 
COOPERATION)
Silicone Silicone Silicone
CROSSMATCH VERIFIER 300CL 
(FLAT OPTICAL SENSOR)
REAL
FAKE 
 (WITH USER 
COOPERATION)
Gelatin Playdoh Silicone
IDENTIX DFR2100 
(FLAT OPTICAL SENSOR)
REAL
FAKE 
 (WITH USER 
COOPERATION)
Gelatin Playdoh Silicone
Figure 8: Typical examples of real and fake fingerprint images that can be found in the public LivDet database used in the experiments,
which can be downloaded from http://prag.diee.unica.it/LivDet09/.
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ATVS PUBLIC DATABASE
BIOMETRIKA  FX2000 
(FLAT OPTICAL SENSOR) 
PRECISE SC 100 
(FLAT CAPACITIVE SENSOR) 
YUBEE with ATMEL’S FINGERCHIP 
(THERMAL SWEEPING SENSOR) 
REAL  
SILICONE
FAKE 
 (WITH USER 
COOPERATION) 
SILICONE
FAKE 
 (WITHOUT 
USER
COOPERATION) 
Figure 9: Typical examples of real and fake fingerprint images that can be found in the public ATVS database used in the experiments, which
can be downloaded from http://atvs.ii.uam.es/.
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LivDet DB
Development (Real/Fake) Test (Real/Fake)
Biometrika FX2000 (569 dpi) 520/520s 1473/1480s
CrossMatch Verifier 300CL (500 dpi) 1000/1000 (310s+344g+346p) 3000/3000 (930s+1036g+1034p)
Identix DFR2100 (686 dpi) 750/750 (250s+250g+250p) 2250/2250 (750s+750g+750p)
Table 2: General structure of the LivDet DB used in the experiments. The distribution of the fake images is given in terms of the materials
used for their generation: s for silicone, g for gelatin, and p for playdoh.
ATVS DB
Development (Real/Fake) Test (Real/Fake)
Biometrika FX2000 (569 dpi) 255/255 (127c+128nc) 255/255 (127c+128nc)
Precise SC100 (500 dpi) 255/255 (127c+128nc) 255/255 (127c+128nc)
Yubee (500 dpi) 255/255 (127c+128nc) 255/255 (127c+128nc)
Table 3: General structure of the ATVS DB used in the experiments. The distribution of the fake images is given in terms of the procedure
used for their generation: cooperative (c), or non-cooperative (nc).
Rate) computes the percentage of real fingerprints as-
signed to the fake class. The evaluation scheme followed in
the experimental protocol presents two successive stages,
training and validation, designed to obtain totally unbi-
ased results:
• Stage 1: Training. The best feature subsets are
computed on the development sets defined in Ta-
bles 2 and 3. The results of this step are presented in
Sect. 5.1. These optimal subsets will be the same for
all the successive steps of the performance evaluation
process.
• Stage 2: Validation. In order to obtain a better
estimation of the classification capabilities of the al-
gorithm, cross validation is performed exchanging de-
velopment and test sets. The final Average Classi-
fication Error is computed as the mean of the ACE
corresponding to each of the two stages of the cross
validation process. Thus, the steps carried out in this
stage are:
– Step 2.1: First part of the cross validation. With
the best feature subsets found in the training
stage the performance of the system is computed
using the development sets for training the clas-
sifier and the test sets for evaluating the perfor-
mance. The result of this step is ACE1 (respec-
tively FLR1 and FRR1).
– Step 2.2: Second part of the cross validation. Us-
ing the best feature subsets found in the training
stage the performance of the system is computed
exchanging development and test sets, that is,
the test sets are used for training the classifier
and the development sets for evaluating the per-
formance. The result of this step is ACE2 (re-
spectively FLR2 and FFR2).
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Figure 10: Evolution of the ACE for the best feature subsets with
an increasing number of features, and for the three datasets.
– Step 2.3: The final classification error of the sys-
tem is computed as: ACE = (ACE1 +ACE2)/2.
The results obtained in each of the two stages are ana-
lyzed in the following sections.
5.1. Stage 1: Training
The first objective of the experiments is to find the op-
timal feature subsets (out of the proposed 10 feature set)
for each of the different acquisition devices comprised in
the two databases. Then the classification performance of
each of the optimal subsets is computed on each of the
datasets in terms of the Average Classification Error.
In order to find the optimal feature subsets, for each
of the six datasets in the final database, the classification
performance of each of the 1,023 possible feature subsets
was computed on the development sets given in Tables 2
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Best feature subsets for quality-based liveness detection
Database Sensor Ridge Strength Ridge Continuity Ridge Clarity
QOCL QE QLOQ QCOF QMEAN QSTD QLCS1 QLCS2 QA QV AR ACE
Biometrika × × × × × × × 1.73
LivDet CrossMatch × × × × × × 11.15
Identix × × × × × × × 6.87
Biometrika × × × × × × × 3.53
ATVS Precise × × × × × × 1.47
Yubee × × × × × × 3.05
Table 4: Best performing feature subsets for the different datasets in the two validation databases (LivDet and ATVS). The ACE is given in
%. The symbol × means that the feature is considered in the subset.
and 3 using the leave-one-out technique (i.e., all the sam-
ples in the development set are used to train the classifier
except the one being classified).
The evolution of the ACE produced by each of the best
feature subsets, for an increasing number of features, and
for the six datasets is shown in Fig. 10. We can observe in
Fig. 10 the curse of dimensionality effect as the minimum
error rate is reached in all cases for the best subset com-
prising 6 or 7 parameters, increasing slightly when new
features are considered.
The best feature subsets found for each of the sensors
are shown in Table 4, where a × means that the feature
is included in the subset. The Average Classification Er-
ror for each of the best subsets is shown on the right in
percentage.
From the results shown in Table 4 we can observe that
there is no feature that is not included at least in one of
the optimal subsets which indicates that all the proposed
features are relevant for fingerprint liveness detection. Pa-
rameters QE and QOCL are present in the best feature
subsets of all datasets, thus, we may conclude that the
most discriminant features are those measuring the ridge
strength. Also, one ridge clarity features, QSTD, and one
ridge continuity parameter QLOQ, are shown to provide
good discriminative capabilities with all sensors (are just
discarded in one of the best six subsets). On the other
hand, the least useful features for liveness detection appear
to be the ridge continuity related QCOF , together with
most of the rest ridge clarity features (QLCS1, QLCS2, and
QV AR), which are only included in half or less of the best
feature subsets. The information extracted from Table 4
on the discriminant capabilities of the different parameters
according to the ridge property measured is summarized
in Table 5.
In Table 4 we can also see that the best parameteriza-
tion found for both datasets captured with the Biometrika
FX2000 sensor (one from the LivDet DB and the other
from the ATVS DB) is the same. This fact suggests that
the best feature subsets are consistent between sets of data
captured under different scenarios as long as the same ac-
quisition device is deployed.
Discriminative Power
Ridge Strength Ridge Continuity Ridge Clarity
High (QE , QOCL) Medium (QLOQ) Medium (QSTD, QMEAN )
Table 5: Summary for the six datasets of the parameters discrim-
inant power according to the ridge property measured. The best
performing features are specified in each case.
5.2. Stage 2: Validation
The best feature subsets found on the development sets
and analyzed in Sect. 5.1, are used here to evaluate the
performance of the proposed liveness detection system on
the different datasets comprised in the whole evaluation
database, following the general cross validation approach
described in Sect. 5. The performance results of the pro-
posed liveness detection scheme are given in Table 6 where
we can see that the overall classification error of the system
is around 10%.
The ACE results for the two cross validation steps are
very consistent through all the different datasets except
for the LivDet DB dataset captured with the Biometrika
sensor (highlighted in grey). In this particular case we
can observe a very big difference in the performance of
the system when the training and test sets are exchanged,
with an abnormally high False Fake Rate (over 50%) when
the development set is used for training and the test set
for evaluation. This same behaviour was observed in the
rest of the participants in the LivDet competition (results
of the competition are analyzed in [17]).
Furthermore, for this dataset (Biometrika.LD) there is
a huge difference in the performance of the algorithm
between the training stage (ACE=1.73% as is shown
in the first row of Table 4) and the validation tests
(ACE=26.5%); gap which is not observed in the rest of
the datasets, where the classification error in both cases,
training and validation, are very similar.
These facts, combined with the homogeneous perfor-
mance results obtained in the rest of the datasets, sug-
gests that there exists some inconsistency between the
Biometrika development and test data provided in the
LivDet competition. Thus, it may be concluded that a
more realistic ACE for the Biometrika.LD dataset would
be around 10%, which would also be closer to the error rate
achieved in the other dataset captured with the Biometrika
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Performance Results in %
FLR1/FLR2 FFR1/FFR2 ACE1/ACE2 ACE
Biomet.LD 3.1/9.8 71.8/21.5 37.4/15.6 26.5
CrossMatch 8.8/16.7 20.8/6.8 14.8/11.7 13.2
Identix 4.8/8.0 5.0/9.1 4.9/8.5 6.7
Biomet.ATVS 9.4/0.4 1.5/11.8 5.5/6.1 5.8
Precise 3.1/0.4 13.7/0.4 8.4/0.4 4.4
Yubee 2.7/1.6 6.3/13.0 4.5/7.3 5.9
Total 5.3/6.1 19.8/10.4 12.5/8.2 10.4
Table 6: Performance results of the proposed liveness detection method on the different datasets considered in the validation experiments.
The subindexes 1 and 2 stand respectively for the results obtained on the first and second stages of the cross validation process.
sensor (Biometrika.ATVS). Assuming this more realistic
ACE of 10% in the case of Biometrika.LD, the final over-
all classification error of the proposed liveness detection
scheme would be around 7.5%.
6. Conclusions
A novel fingerprint parameterization for liveness de-
tection based on quality related measures has been pro-
posed. The feature set has been used in a complete live-
ness detection system, and tested on two publicly available
databases: i) the database used in the 2009 LivDet com-
petition [17], and ii) a database captured at the ATVS
group [13]. These two challenging databases permit to
test the proposed liveness detection scheme under totally
different operational scenarios in terms of the technology
used by the acquisition devices (flat optical, flat capacitive,
and sweeping thermal), material with which the gummy
fingers are produced (gelatin, silicone and playdoh), and
procedure followed to generate the fake fingers (with and
without the cooperation of the user).
The high performance shown by the proposed system
under these completely diverse testing scenarios, correctly
classifying almost 90% of the fingerprint images, proves its
ability to adapt to all type of direct attacks and its effi-
ciency as a method to minimize their effect and enhance
the general security capability of fingerprint verification
systems. Furthermore, using two public datasets will per-
mit to fairly compare the results with other liveness detec-
tion techniques from the state of the art, giving an added
value to the conclusions and observations extracted from
the experiments
The proposed approach is part of the software-based
solutions as it distinguishes between images produced by
real and fake fingers based only on the acquired sample,
and not on other physiological measures (e.g., odor, heart-
beat, skin impedance) captured by special hardware de-
vices added to the sensor (i.e., hardware-based solutions
that increase the cost of the sensors, and are more intru-
sive to the user). Unlike previously presented methods,
the proposed technique classifies each image in terms of
features extracted from just that image, and not from dif-
ferent samples of the fingerprint. This way the acquisition
process is faster and more convenient to the final user (that
does not need to keep his finger on the sensor for a few sec-
onds, or place it several times).
Liveness detection solutions such as the one presented in
this work are of great importance in the biometric field as
they help to prevent direct attacks (those carried out with
synthetic traits, and very difficult to detect), enhancing
this way the level of security offered to the user.
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